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Abstract:
Purpose: This  study  analyzes  work  safety  perceptions  among  workers  and  safety  experts  in  the
construction industry. Furthermore, we evaluate whether experiential learning (i.e., labor experience) and
knowledge-enhancing practices,  that  we link  to safety  training,  explain the  differences  in  work  safety
perceptions of  workers and safety experts by triggering different types of  overconfidence biases.
Design/methodology/approach: The  proposed  hypothesis  are  tested  by  applying  ordered  probit
models on a unique dataset comprising information for 558 employees and 215 safety experts working in
the Spanish construction sector.
Findings: The results reveal that previous labor market experience has a significantly negative effect on
perceived work safety, that is, risk awareness decreases with respect to labor experience. However, the
findings indicate that differences in perceived work safety between workers and safety experts are not
explained by previous  labor  experience.  Furthermore,  the  results  suggest  that  higher  levels  of  safety
training,  which  we  link  to  the  acquisition  of  codified  knowledge,  negatively  impacts  workers’  safety
perceptions, while this effect turns positive among safety experts. This result suggests that safety experts’
perceived work safety is affected by overconfidence that results from their greater safety-specific training
(over-precision bias).
Originality/value: Work safety constitutes a relevant key performance indicator. The proposed analysis
of  the  role  of  labor  experience  and  safety  training  on  perceived  work  safety  in  different  types  of
employees contributes to better understand how organizations can improve the management of  their
workforce by triggering specific actions, such as the design of  customized training programs, that may help
in reducing the safety disconnect between employees, in terms of  perceived work safety.
Keywords: safety  disconnect,  perceived work safety,  overconfidence,  over-estimation bias,  over-precision  bias,
ordered probit model, workforce management
1. Introduction
Work safety has increasingly drawn scholarly and policy attention (e.g., Abad, Lafuente & Vilajosana, 2013; Neal &
Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2002). Overall, safety management is an important factor that should be included in the
agenda of  any organization as it contributes to improve the management of  the workforce within the organization,
reduce the number of  occupational injuries and, ultimately, enhance business operations (Abad et al., 2013). The
efficient analysis of  occupational risks constitutes a critical aspect of  work safety management (Porru, Placidi, Carta
& Alessio, 2006). A deficient management of  occupational risk assessments may lead to harmful consequences to
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workers, businesses, insurance companies and the society. According to the European Agency for Safety and Health
at Work (EU-OSHA, 2013), the economic costs and operational losses of  work accidents to workers, businesses,
and public administrations represent 3% of  the EU’s gross domestic product. The growing awareness of  the
importance of  safety management has led European governing bodies to adopt specific policies within the EU
2020 strategic plan aimed at stimulating safe work conditions (European Commission, 2007).
From a business perspective, organizations suffer important losses as a result of  poor safety management practices
and work accidents. On the one hand, prior work emphasizes that the prioritization of  safety management practices
(e.g.,  adoption  or  development  of  safety  systems  or  more  rigorous  safety  controls)  creates  a  safer  work
environment, which fulfills workers’ safety needs and allows them to pursue operational goals (Das, Pagell, Behm &
Veltri, 2008). Also, increased safety controls may reduce operational losses linked to poor safety practices, such as
unpredicted production breaks, absenteeism and labor turnover, and this will likely impact economic performance
(Abad et al., 2013; Lafuente & Abad, 2018). On the other hand, in the US, conservative estimates point to nearly 6
million occupational injuries and 6,000 fatalities per year which cost about 140 billion dollars (Porru et al., 2006).
Therefore, efficient safety management practices are needed to reduce accidents and their economic costs as well as
the number of  nonproductive downtime hours which may well result in higher productivity and improved business
performance (Abad et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Garzon, Lucas-Ruiz, Martínez-Fiestas & Delgado-Padial, 2014).
Training programs (formal encoded knowledge) and greater labor experience (experiential knowledge) are often
invoked  as  solutions  to  improve  work  safety  conditions  (e.g.,  Hung,  Winchester,  Smith-Jackson,  Kleiner,
Babski-Reeves  & Mills,  2013;  Perlman,  Sacks  & Barak,  2014).  Nevertheless,  organizations  do  not  realize  the
generally positive effects of  these types of  knowledge. This is the core of  this study. We argue that both employees
and safety experts carry out different operational tasks and are exposed to different work risks which create a safety
disconnect, defined in terms of  the discrepancies in work safety perceptions between workers and safety experts.
More  concretely,  this  study  scrutinizes  work  safety  perceptions  among  workers  and  safety  experts  in  the
construction  industry.  Furthermore,  we  evaluate  whether  experiential  learning  (i.e.,  labor  experience)  and
knowledge-enhancing practices,  that we link to safety training, explain the differences in work safety perceptions of
workers and safety experts by triggering different types of  overconfidence biases.
The  empirical  application  uses  a  unique  dataset  comprising  information  for  558 employees  and  215  safety
experts working in the Spanish construction sector. The proposed analysis of  the role of  labor experience and
safety training on perceived work safety in different types of  employees contributes to our understanding on
how organizations can improve the management of  their workforce by triggering specific actions linked to the
design of  customized training programs that may help in reducing the discrepancies between safety experts and
employees (i.e., the safety disconnect) in terms of  perceived work safety.
The remainder of  the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical underpinning and the study
hypotheses. In section 3 the sample, variables and the method are presented. Empirical results are found in Section
4, while the final section provides the concluding remarks and implications.
2. Background Theory and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Work Safety Management and Perceived Work Safety
A good starting point for this section is to question ‘what is risk?’ Work risks have been studied by many scholars in
different disciplines from engineering (Rodríguez-Garzon et al., 2014; Rundmo, 2000; Sjöberg, 2000) to philosophy
(Zohar & Luria, 2005). Traditionally, risk is defined as a qualitative (subjective) construct that includes the likeliness
of  hazard and its potential consequences (in terms of  work accidents) (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read &
Combs, 1978; Rundmo, 2000).
Two groups of  factors characterize risk: 1) dread, as the extent to which a hazard causes feelings of  fear (related to
lack of  control, dreaded consequences, catastrophic potential and fatal consequences), and 2) obscurity, as a level of
risk understanding (related to knowledge, immediacy of  consequences, newness and observability) (Portell, Gil,
Losilla & Vives, 2014). Therefore, work risk assessments include hazard identification, risk characterization, risk
level assessment, evaluation of  the probability of  occurrence and expectations about severity of  accidents (Porru et
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al., 2006). Hazard identification and risk awareness are the first steps in safety management practices oriented to
enhance employees’ perceived safety (Perlman et al., 2014).
Because of  its subjective evaluation, risk awareness and perceived work safety have been studied by psychologists
and sociologists using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The dominant approach in this field is the
psychometric paradigm which assumes risk as subjectively defined by individuals who can be influenced by a wide
array of  psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors (Portell et al., 2014). Hallowell (2010) defines risk
perception as an individual’s subjective judgment of  the frequency and severity of  a particular danger. 
In parallel to this research stream, another important dimension of  safety management relates to perceived work
safety. Prior studies argue that perceived work safety is, to a certain extent, shaped by organizational factors (e.g.,
work safety climate) and that greater average levels of  perceived safety are associated with fewer work accidents
(Arcury, Summers, Rushing, Grzywacz, Mora, Quandt et al., 2015; Huang, Verma, Chang, Courtney, Lombardi,
Brennan et  al.,  2012). Thus,  safety climate is the collective outcome of  individual workers’  perceptions about
organizational policies and practices which they relate to the value and importance of  safety within the business
(Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 2002, 2003).
Note that safety climate has two dimensions: the shared-group safety climate and the individual psychological safety
climate (Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke, 2009). The group-level safety climate is defined as shared perceptions
of  the work environment and characteristics as they pertain to safety matters that affect a group of  individuals,
while  the  psychological  safety  climate  is  the  individual  perception  of  safety-related  policies,  practices,  and
procedures that affect personal well-being at work (Huang et al., 2012). The individual safety climate, which is
linked to perceived work safety, is the focus of  this study. 
The relevance of  balancing internal practices, which are an antecedent of  business productivity, with work safety
flows  from the recognition that  perceived work safety  is  a  time-varying  construct  that  interacts  with other
(operational and organizational) factors seeking increased levels of  adaptation to operational and environmental
changes and, ultimately, shape the organizations’ safety system (Woods, 2015; Niskanen, 2018). These arguments
are in consonance with postulates of  the Resilience Engineering theory that emphasizes the relevance for the
business’ operational and safety system of  harmonizing work environmental conditions with safety practices
(Patriarca,  Bergström,  Di  Gravio  &  Costantino,  2018).  Underlying  this  literature  is  the  presumption  that
organizations  are  systems  whose  level  of  complexity  results  from the  interactions  between  its  constituent
components (e.g., organizational, operational, safety-related). In this sense, resilience engineering deals with the
evaluation of  the functioning of  complex systems, including risk determinants and the factors that affect human
performance, to provide systems engineering tools that contribute to manage risks proactively (Niskanen, 2018;
Patriarca et al., 2018).
The significance of  improving workers’ perceived safety is based, among other things, on the need to increase
self-protective and safety behaviors (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Also, low levels of  perceived work
safety potentially create stress, and this leads to unsafe behaviors at work (Rundmo, 1996). Following this line of
reasoning, Hallowell (2010) finds that the number of  work accidents is highly correlated with the violation of  safety
standards. Perlman et al. (2014) state that work accidents may originate from carelessness or lack of  risk awareness
on the part of  workers. However, other researchers show that accidents are not primarily caused by workers’ risk
awareness but rather by management failures (Baxendale & Jones, 2000). 
In this sense, the capacity of  management to accurately describe work tasks as they are actually carried out, rather
than as  usually  described in  operating  procedures  or  static  models,  largely  contributes  to  create/develop the
employees’  capability  to  cope with complex,  adaptive  systems (De Carvalho,  Righi,  Huber,  Lemos,  Jatoba &
Gomes, 2018). Therefore, monitoring and understanding the gap between prescription (or work as imagined) and
practice (or work as done) is critical for the effective design of  managerial and safety systems (Braithwaite, Wears &
Hollnagel, 2017).
Among the factors under the control of  the employer, safety training is often invoked as an efficient mechanism for
improving workers’ risk assessment and perceived safety level. Training is needed to achieve effective levels of
hazard perception and to reduce work accidents (Rodríguez-Garzon et al., 2014). Additionally, the effectiveness of
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training methods heavily relies on its capacity to narrow the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done by
reflecting the reality of  job tasks performed by employees, as well as to allow space for constant improvement of
theoretical and formal aspects of  work operations, which can be guided by tacit or contextual knowledge developed
through day-to-day work experiences (De Carvalho et al.,  2018). Zimolong and Trimpop (1998) propose that
workers’ experience and training contribute to improve work safety perceptions via enhanced identification of  work
risks. In summary, the perception of  work safety is malleable (Starren, Hornikx & Luijters, 2013). Various studies
show that perceived work safety can be improved by exploiting both prior experience on work accidents (Gucer,
Oliver & McDiarmid, 2003; Mearns, Flin, Gordon & Fleming, 1998) and the workers’ labor experience (Mohamed,
Ali & Tam, 2009).
Perceived work safety is  a  highly  subjective  construct  (Gierlach,  Belsher & Beutler,  2010),  and differences  in
safety-specific knowledge may explain variations in this variable. So can a person’s involvement in the day-to-day
operations of  a business. 
Furthermore, perceived work safety is also heterogeneous across the different types of  employees working for the
organization (Fischhoff  et al., 1978; Portell et al., 2014). While employees are more familiar with the different work
risks and have experienced (or witnessed) work accidents, safety experts who design and implement safety measures
may have a different mindset regarding safety at work (Perlman et al., 2014). This may amplify the gap between
work-as-imagined  and  work-as-done  among  safety  experts  compared  to  workers  and,  ultimately,  affect  the
effectiveness of  work safety measures (De Carvalho et al., 2018).
We argue that experiential knowledge generates valuable tacit know-how among workers and that this shapes their
safety perceptions, while safety experts’ perceived safety is primarily driven by formal and codified safety knowledge
associated with the more academic nature of  their human capital (Huang et al., 2012). Both sources of  knowledge
are equally valuable; however, risk assessments can significantly vary as a result of  differences in knowledge and in
self-confidence biases linked to knowledge acquisition processes. The factors affecting perceived safety are not yet
sufficiently evaluated, and this study seeks to explore how different sources of  knowledge contribute to explain
variations in work safety perceptions among safety experts, who design and coordinate work safety plans and
strategies and workers, who execute work safety practices within the organization.
2.2. Overconfidence
Overconfidence is a complex concept that has been widely studied. The phenomenon of  overconfidence may
represent a driving force for engaging in various positive behaviors, including entrepreneurship entry decisions (e.g.,
Hogarth & Karelaia, 2012; Lafuente, Vaillant & Rialp, 2007) or enhanced safety behavior (Zohar, 2002; Zohar &
Luria, 2005). But, overconfidence may also have negative consequences, such as strikes, litigation or entrepreneurial
failure (Howard, 1983; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Neale & Bazerman, 1985). People
behavior is susceptible to the influence of  overconfidence, especially in the decision-making and judgments and
there is the greatest danger behind it, as overconfidence can lead to significant negative consequences (Plous, 1993:
page 217). 
Scholars have traditionally studied overconfidence as a homogenous construct. Nevertheless, Moore and Healy
(2008:  page  502)  emphasize  that  overconfidence  is  heterogeneous,  and  identify  three  different  types  of
overconfidence:  overestimation  of  one’s  actual  capacities,  over-placement  or  better-than-average,  and
over-precision.
The  overestimation  in  one’s  actual  capacities  refers  to  the  person’s  inflated  perception  of  his/her  abilities,
performance, level of  control, or chances of  success. For example, the overestimation of  one’s own entrepreneurial
abilities  has been found to explain both excess entrepreneurial  entry and failure (Hogarth & Karelaia,  2012).
Over-placement or better-than-average bias appears when people believe themselves to be better than the majority
at any focal task (such as when a majority of  people rate themselves better than the median at any task). Over-
precision represents the excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of  one’s beliefs. A typical test of  over-precision is
to ask respondents a numerical question, for example, ‘How many cities there are in the world?’ and then give
participants  the  opportunity  to  provide  90%  confidence  interval  estimates  around  their  answers.  Narrow
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confidence intervals would suggest that people are too sure about their answer; while wide confidence intervals are
evidence of  lack of  confidence in the answer (Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo & Barlas, 1999; Soll & Klayman,
2004).
Moore and Healy (2008) propose that people’s beliefs results from the analysis of  two components: the global
average result of  others and the individual’s own performance. Also, task performance experience gives individuals
valuable knowledge and signals  about their  results:  has  it  been done well  or  bad and how much (Argote &
Miron-Spektor, 2011). Furthermore, people benchmark themselves to predict others’ outcomes and consider these
results useful (Krueger, Acevedo & Robbins, 2005).
Nevertheless, people have imperfect information about their own performance, abilities, or chance of  success; and
they have even worse information about others (Moore & Healy, 2008). As a consequence, people’s estimates of
themselves are regressive, and their estimates of  others are even more regressive. So far, we have argued that people
make imperfect estimates of  their own performance; the more familiar the focal problems is, the better information
people have about their performance; and that people have superior information about themselves within their
group rather than about other people outside their group. 
Overall, this theory can be applied to different phenomena like for example individual performance, deductions
about abilities as well as behaviors and traits. Furthermore, these arguments can prove themselves useful to evaluate
the effect of  experience and formal knowledge on perceived safety. This latter point is the focus of  this study.
In our approach, different types of  workers develop different types of  overconfidence which creates variations in
the perception about work safety. While employees acquire and develop experiential knowledge linked to their
day-to-day tasks, safety experts—who may not be familiar with the work environment—acquire specific safety
codified knowledge  that  guides  their  safety  perceptions  and evaluations.  We believe  that  this  creates  a  safety
disconnect between workers’ and safety experts’ perception of  safety that is worth studying.
2.3. Safety Disconnect and Hypothesis Development
This study examines whether there is a disconnection between workers’ and technicians’ perception of  safety at
work and, if  so, whether different types of  knowledge explain this safety disconnect.
Fischhoff  et al. (1978) show that there are significant differences between non-experts’ views on safety and experts’
statements because,  unlike experts,  non-experts evaluate risks intuitively, informally  and less precisely.  In their
analysis,  Portell  et  al.  (2014)  find  that  participants  (employees)  gave  a  greater  valuation  to  their  own  safety
knowledge relative to that of  safety experts (the questions about the expert knowledge were characterized as the
knowledge of  health and safety by managers of  the company). This is in line with our arguments that experts have
superior safety-specific knowledge than workers. Prior work has analyzed differences in safety perceptions using
various factors, such as work environment (Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005); demographic aspects (Björk, Lindqvist,
Poukkula, Ravald, West & Åhman, 2004; Boix, García, Llorens & Torada, 2001; Sjöberg, 2000); and emotional
conditions,  such  as  fear,  anger,  or  stress (Grasmück  &  Scholz  2005).  Results  are  mixed.  Moreover,
Rodríguez-Garzon et al. (2014) found that among all socio-demographic elements only training explains differences
in people’s safety perceptions. 
Huang et al. (2012) propose that workers and safety experts working for the same organization may have similar
safety perceptions because workers’ individual safety perceptions are developed, estimated, and prioritized by
observing those of  supervisors. On the other hand, safety experts and employees are different as the former
group designs and implements safety policies and procedures and conduct safety training for employees, while
the latter group receives the training and observe how experts implement safety policies and procedures. Huang
et al. (2012) also found that safety perceptions were not consistent between safety supervisors and employees
because they may have had different opportunities to observe and evaluate safety performance at the workplace.
This result suggests that differences in the origin of  safety knowledge may lead to a safety disconnect, in terms
of  safety  perceptions,  between  safety  experts  and  employees,  even  if  both  groups  work  for  the  same
organization. Hung et al. (2013) reveal that workers perceive that their safety knowledge is high, and that workers
do not value working safely due to the presence of  a strong overconfidence bias.
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Despite the rigorous efforts, these studies do not identify the source of  the differences in work safety perceptions
(Portell et al., 2014). In this study, we propose that the safety disconnect between workers and experts, in terms of
perceived work safety, can be explained by the differentiating effect of  labor experience and formal training over
safety perceptions. In our view, different types of  overconfidence may influence workers and safety experts which
may explain the observed differences in safety perceptions. 
For both workers and safety experts, work safety perceptions are not only subjective, but also shaped by their own
beliefs, knowledge, and experience. 
In the case of  workers, safety knowledge is primarily driven by task-performance experience and, in their work
roles,  they  often  have to  choose  between higher  level  of  safety  and  better  performance  (Abad et  al.,  2013;
Caponecchia & Sheils, 2011). The differential value of  productivity results associated with less use of  personal
protective equipment (PPE) and greater unsafe behaviors are associated with lower productivity levels (Arcury,
Summers,  Carrillo,  Grzywacz,  Quandt  & Mills,  2014).  For  example,  Arcury  et  al.  (2015)  report  that  Latino
construction  workers  prioritize  productivity  over  work  safety  mostly  due  to  employment  needs,  comfort
preferences and the created belief  that their knowledge leads to better decision-making which minimizes potential
work accidents. That is, from their experiential knowledge workers underestimate some risks (poor risk awareness)
and overestimated own abilities. Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that workers may develop overconfidence
due to the overestimation of  their own actual capacities.
Concerning safety experts, their safety knowledge mostly results from formal specific sources (university, specific
courses, training), and they prioritize workplace safety conditions. In this case, we argue that safety experts’ superior
formal knowledge yields to overconfidence due to the over-precision (excessive certainty) regarding the accuracy of
their estimations. For example, Porru et al. (2006) highlight the increased safety awareness among managers and
safety experts as workers do not have the knowledge to accurately value all work risks. Perlman et al. (2014) suggest
that, even after many years of  experience, construction workers and superintendents were unable to identify all
hazards at the site; and that they give a greater weight to risk levels in their assessments based on accident severity
considerations, instead of  the probabilistic component of  risk.
This theory and evidence suggests that there is a safety disconnect in the safety perceptions of  safety experts and
workers,  and  that  this  disconnect  may  originate  from knowledge-based  differences  that  translate  in  different
overconfidence bias. From these arguments, we therefore hypothesize: 
H1: Among workers,  perceived safety at work is influenced by overconfidence arising from greater labor experience (over-
estimation bias) 
H2: Among safety experts, perceived safety at work is affected by overconfidence that results from their greater formal safety-
specific training (over-precision bias)
3. Data, Variable Definition and Method
3.1. Data
The empirical illustration of  this study uses a unique dataset on work safety. The questionnaire employed in this
work was designed specifically for the purposes of  this study, and the data collection process was entirely designed,
implemented  and supervised  by  a  team of  the  Barcelona  School  of  Building  Construction  (EPSEB)  at  the
Polytechnic University of  Catalonia (UPC BarcelonaTech). The information was collected between the last quarter
of  2010 and the first quarter of  2011 by applying the questionnaire to construction workers and safety experts
working in the construction industry. 
Construction workers and safety experts working in the construction industry were approached at the construction
site, or in their office in the case of  some safety experts, with a request to participate in the study in the form of  a
brief  talk where the team member explained the purposes and the strictly scientific scope of  the study. Also, in this
initial stage participants received confirmation on confidentiality. Once the team member obtained the respondents’
approval,  data  collection  was  achieved  through  self-administrated,  structured  face-to-face  interviews  where
construction workers and safety experts were asked to answer essentially close questions. It should be kept in mind
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that, following the practice recommended in the literature (Colton & Covert, 2007), the questionnaire was also
subject to a pre-test in order to correct potentially misleading or confusing questions.
The original data base comprises information for 799 individuals (584 construction workers and 215 safety experts).
However, in the interest of  following a rigorous methodology that ensures the robustness of  the results, only
observations for which a complete dataset of  the analyzed variables could be obtained were included. Thus, we
excluded 26  cases,  all  construction  workers,  with  incomplete  data  due  to  the  refusal  or  unawareness  of  the
respondent to answer questions mostly related to their perceived level of  work safety, the number of  hours of
safety training in their personal record, and their relationship with co-workers. Therefore, the final sample includes
information for 773 individuals of  which 558 are constructions workers and 215 are safety experts.
3.2. Variable Definition
Perceived safety at work. In this study, the dependent variable measures the perceived level of  work safety among the
surveyed employees and supervisors. Both employees and safety supervisors were asked along a five-point Likert
scale to value the safety level at their workplace (1= not at all dangerous and 5= extremely dangerous) (question:
On a scale of  1 (not at all dangerous) to 5 (extremely dangerous), how do you evaluate the level of  hazardousness
of  the tasks you develop within the organization?). The frequency distribution in Table 1 shows that the greatest
proportion of  respondents perceive their workplace as ‘moderately dangerous’ and ‘very dangerous’ (34.93%). A
more in-depth examination reveals that experts perceive greater risks at work than workers: 82.79% of  experts
perceive that their workplace is ‘moderately dangerous’ or a ‘very dangerous’, whereas this proportion stands at
64.88% among workers.
Additionally, 15.01% of  respondents indicate that their workplace is ‘extremely dangerous’. The proportion of
workers who manifest to work in an ‘extremely dangerous’ place is greater (16.67%) relative to that of  experts
(10.70%).  Furthermore,  respondents  falling  into  the  ‘not  at  all  dangerous’  and  ‘slightly  dangerous’  categories
account for 15.14% of  the full  sample,  and the proportion of  workers who positively  valued safety at  work
(18.36%) more than doubles that found for supervisors (6.52%).
Not at all
dangerous 
(1)
Slightly
dangerous 
(2)
Moderately
dangerous 
(3)
Very
dangerous
(4)
Extremely
dangerous
(5)
Observations 33 84 270 270 116
Proportion 4.27% 10.87% 34.93% 34.93% 15.01%
Table 1. Frequency table of  perceived safety at work
Accumulated knowledge. We use two variables to measure accumulated knowledge. First, we include the total years of
labor experience, expressed in years. Second, we employ the number of  hours of  formal safety training to measure
the specific safety knowledge accumulated by individuals (employees and safety experts). Average labor experience
is 10 and 11 years for safety experts and workers, respectively. The significant discrepancy lies in the safety training.
We found that the sampled technicians (safety experts) have, on average, 242 hours of  safety training, while for
workers this value stands at 21 hours. This result only reflects the differences in training standards. Construction
workers are not required to have specific safety training, and this becomes evident in our sample: 17.38% (97) of
the sampled workers reported no prior safety training, while 27.96% (156 workers) chose to attend a safety training
program (for this group, the training course has a duration of  between 30 and 300 hours). Because their tasks and
decision-making are critical to ensure compliance with applicable safety practices and regulations, formal (certified)
knowledge is required to safety experts. The descriptive results in Table 2 are in line with this notion: 49.77% (107)
of  safety experts attended the basic safety course of  30 hours, 21.86% (47) took the safety training course of  300
hours, while 28.37% (61) safety experts attended the 600 hours course.
Control variables. We control for the perceived level of  working load, work interruptions, and the relationship with
co-workers in our model specifications. Perceived level of  working load measures the individual perception of
-63-
Journal of  Industrial Engineering and Management – https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2467
amount, intensity, difficulty as well as occupational stress. Both employees and safety supervisors were asked along a
four-point Likert scale to value the perceived level of  workload (1= not at all busy and stressed, 2= moderately
busy and stressed, 3= very busy and stressed and 4= extremely busy and stressed) (question: On a scale of  1 (not at
all busy and stressed) to 4 (extremely busy and stressed), how would you rate your current workload?). Also, we
introduced a dummy variable taking the value of  one if  the person considers that he/she is frequently interrupted
by others (co-workers, managers, etc.) or work-related events (e.g. unexpected meetings, accidents, etc.). Finally, we
introduced a variable that  measures the relationship with co-workers (question:  how would you evaluate your
personal relationship with your co-workers?). This variable was measured via a five-point Likert scale (1= not at all
good and 5= extremely good).
Workers Safety experts Full sample
Perceived safety at work 3.3961 (1.0765)*** 3.6093 (0.8006) 3.4554 (1.0114)
Labor experience (years) 11.18 (10.02) 9.98 (9.82) 10.85 (9.97)
Safety training (hours) 21.26 (29.54)*** 241.95 (252.86) 82.64 (167.77)
Perceived level of  working load 2.5556 (0.7833)** 2.7581 (0.9653) 2.6119 (0.8422)
Work interruptions 0.3620 (0.4810)*** 0.6326 (0.4832) 0.4373 (0.4964)
Relationship with co-workers 3.7724 (0.7533)** 3.9302 (0.8427) 3.8163 (0.7818)
Observations 558 215 773
Standard deviation is presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate that, for each variable, the valuation made by workers and
supervisors is significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the selected variables
3.3. Method
Similar to other multinomial-choice variables analyzed in previous research dealing with safety issues (e.g., injury
severity of  car crashes and work accidents), work safety perceptions are inherently ordered (see the recent survey of
Savolainen, Mannering, Lord & Quddus, 2011). Therefore, an ordered probit model was chosen as econometric
tool to test the proposed hypotheses that emphasize the role of  labor experience (H1) and formal training (H2) on
the level of  perceived work safety among employees and technicians (Greene, 2003).
The ordered probit model is built around a latent regression of  the form  y* =  βx’ + ε, where  y* is the latent
unobserved dependent variable (perceived safety at work),  x’ is the vector of  variables determining the discrete
ordering for each observation, β is the vector of  parameter estimates, and ε is the normally distributed error term
(Long, 1997). In this study, respondents choose the category that most closely represents their own perception on
work safety conditions (Table 1). The ordered probit model that defines each category of  the variable linked to
perceived safety at work ( j = 1, …, 5) has the following form:
y j=1 = 1   if    y* ≤ ų1
y j=2 = 2   if    ų1 ≤ y* ≤ ų2
y j=3 = 3   if    ų2 ≤ y* ≤ ų3
y j=4 = 4   if    ų3 ≤ y* ≤ ų4
y j=5 = 5   if    y* ≥ ų4
(1)
In equation (1) ųj are unknown parameters that are estimated jointly with  β. Coefficients estimated by discrete
choice models, including ordered probit specifications, indicate the direction of  the effect of  the analyzed variable
on the dependent variable. In this study, the full model estimated via ordered probit model has the following form:
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Perceived 
work safetyi = β0 + β1 Workeri + β2 Labor experiencei 
                            + β12 Wokeri × Labor experiencei + β3 Safety trainingi 
                            + β13 Wokeri × Safety trainingi + β4 Controlsi + εi
(2)
In terms of  our hypotheses, we expect that β12  ≠ 0, that is,  workers’ perceived work safety is  influenced by
overconfidence (over-estimation bias) arising from greater labor experience (H1). We also expect that β13 ≠ 0, that
is, among safety experts perceived work safety is affected by overconfidence that results from their greater formal
safety knowledge (H2: over-precision bias).
4. Results
This section presents the results of  the empirical analysis. In Table 3, model specification 1 is the baseline model,
while model 2 is the full model that includes the interaction terms between the ‘worker’ dummy and the different
sources of  knowledge and experience analyzed in this study (equation (2)). Note that the dependent variable in this
analytical section is the level of  perceived safety at work. To evaluate the threat of  collinearity, we computed the
average inflation factor (VIF) for all independent variables. In all model specifications presented in Table 3, the VIF
values are below the commonly used cut-off  threshold of  ten. The results for this diagnostic test do not raise
collinearity concerns.
Concerning the key findings of  the study, regression results in Table 3 show that there is a disconnection between
workers and safety experts, in terms of  perceived work safety; however, this disconnection only becomes evident
when we take into account the differentiating effect of  variables related to accumulated knowledge and experience
in the model (model 2). 
The results in model 1 (Table 3) reveal that previous labor market experience has a significantly negative effect
on perceived work safety, that is, risk awareness decreases with respect to labor experience. Nevertheless, from
model specification 2 we observe that differences in perceived work safety between workers and safety experts
are not explained by previous labor experience in a significant way. This result suggests that labor experience,
which we associate to task repetition, generates experiential learning that is detrimental to safety evaluations, and
that this process may create a perception of  ‘naïve safety’ that affects both construction workers and safety
experts. 
Therefore, we do not find support for our first hypothesis that states that, among construction workers, perceived
safety at work is influenced by overconfidence arising from greater labor experience (over-estimation bias) (H1).
The results for the safety training variables in model 1 indicate that this variable solely does not influence individual
risk assessments that translate in different levels of  perceived work safety.
Nevertheless, the findings for the full model that includes the interaction between the ‘worker’ dummy and safety
training points to the presence of  a differentiated effect of  safety training on workers’ and experts’ work safety
perceptions. From model 2 in Table 3 we note that the coefficient for the safety training variable is positive and
statistically significant, that is, increased safety training (in terms of  hours) yields to superior awareness about the
potential risks at work among safety experts, thus conditioning their assessment of  work safety conditions. 
On contrary, the result for interaction term between the ‘worker’ dummy and the safety training variable show that
higher levels of  safety training, which we link to the acquisition of  codified knowledge, negatively impacts workers’
safety perceptions. These results, that suggest a somewhat contradictory effect of  safety training programs on work
safety perceptions, are in line with our second hypothesis (H2) that states that, among safety experts, perceived
work safety is affected by overconfidence that results from their greater safety-specific training, formal knowledge,
(over-precision bias).
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Model 1 Model 2
Worker –0.1903 (0.1367) 0.6731 (0.3873)*
Labor experience –0.2089 (0.0757)*** –0.0758 (0.1119)
Labor experience X Worker –0.1388 (0.1482)
Safety training (ln hours) 0.0362 (0.0313) 0.1164 (0.0334)***
Safety training X Worker –0.2167 (0.0708)***
Perceived level of  working load 0.2730 (0.0745)*** 0.2884 (0.0759)***
Work interruptions 0.1541 (0.1387) 0.1412 (0.1393)
Relationship with co-workers 0.0314 (0.0852) 0.0439 (0.0851)
Cut 1 –2.7473 (0.5091)*** –2.1399 (0.5480)***
Cut 2 –1.3463 (0.4820)*** -0.7336 (0.5261)
Cut 3 0.4313 (0.4808) 1.0587 (0.5246)***
Cut 4 2.2115 (0.4899)*** 2.8561 (0.5325)***
Log pseudolikelihood –1062.95 –1057.61
Wald test (chi2) 35.30*** 46.70***
Pseudo R2 0.0453 0.0524
Average VIF (min – max) 1.07 (1.01-1.16) 3.68 (1.03-9.66)
Observations 773 773
Robust standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
Table 3. Ordered probit model: Perceived safety at work
5. Concluding Remarks, Implications and Future Research Lines
In this study, we propose that discrepancies exist in the work safety perceptions of  construction workers, compared
to those of  safety experts.  More concretely,  we hypothesized that different types of  overconfidence linked to
experiential learning (labor experience) in the case of  workers, and to greater formal safety knowledge among safety
experts may shape the perceptions about work safety conditions.
Overall, this study provides further evidence that contributes to understand how organizations can improve their
safety training programs in order to enhance the management of  their workforce. Additionally, results reveal that
the effects  of  accumulated knowledge and experience over perceived work safety  are  heterogeneous across
workers.  We argue that  discrepancies  may arise  from differences  in  overconfidence that  may condition  the
coupling of  knowledge-generating efforts to individuals’  risk assessments. On the one hand, we found that,
among workers and safety experts, greater labor experience does not lead to over-estimation bias when it comes
to work risk assessments. On the other hand, greater formal knowledge on work safety conditions increases the
over-precision bias among safety experts, which modifies their work safety perceptions by increasing their risk
awareness.
This paper has implications for scholars and practitioners. From an academic perspective, the results show that
different types of  knowledge (i.e., experiential knowledge resulting from labor experience and specific codified
knowledge  linked  to  formal  training)  may  initiate  different  reactions  among  workers  and  safety  experts  by
generating  different  types  of  overconfidence.  Overconfidence can be  a driving force  for  engaging in  various
positive behaviors, including the assessment of  work risks. However, knowledge generation/acquisition processes
may also lead to less desirable effects over overconfidence (Plous, 1993), such as poor risk awareness. Our analysis
of  the role of  different forms of  knowledge on perceived work safety contributes to a better understanding of  the
conditions under which the effects of  learning-enhancing strategies occur within businesses. Similar to Moore and
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Healy (2008), this study shows that overconfidence is a multi-dimensional concept, and future research should
evaluate the potentially differentiating effects of  different policies and actions on the overconfidence level of  the
targeted subjects (e.g., workers, safety experts, managers, directors). Additionally, the results of  the study provide
new evidence on the presence of  ‘naïve empiricism’ among workers (Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 2000). The findings
suggest that workers’ empirical dogmatism may negatively influence the effect of  safety training over perceived
work safety.
Knowledge generation and exploitation processes, such as training programs, are potentially conducive to business
success; however, these processes will not produce the desired effects if  a misalignment between organizational
practices and the workforce exists. Therefore, for strategy makers we first suggest that managers need to turn their
attention  to  the  characteristics  of  specific  training  programs  oriented  to  improve  safety  knowledge  among
employees and, consequently, work safety conditions. Many organizations promote training programs seeking to
improve the knowledge base of  their workers. Nevertheless, the quick implementation of  training programs is not
enough. Training programs should not be treated as a monolithic concept common to all types of  employees.
Workers  and  safety  experts  are  exposed  to  different  types  of  risks  at  their  work  places,  and  the  different
characteristics of  the operational contexts where employees develop their tasks calls for a profound analysis of
training programs. A greater alignment between the different types of  employees, in terms of  perceived work
safety, is especially relevant in the case of  construction organizations in which the work conditions of  construction
sites are subject to significant variations across projects.
In this sense, managers would be well advised to analyze the characteristics of  work tasks before promoting training
programs. Thus, any attempt to promote workers’ learning via training should be coupled with enhanced strategic
analyses that acknowledge the different operational realities faced by employees. The design of  customized training
programs therefore constitutes a valid option that will likely contribute both to optimizing the potentially positive
outcomes of  knowledge generation practices,  such as training programs;  and to reduce the safety disconnect
between workers and its potential negative operational consequences.
A series of  limitations to the present study must, however, be mentioned. These limitations, in turn, represent
future research lines. First, like other studies on safety management (e.g., Perlman et al., 2014; Zohar & Luria, 2005),
the data do not permit the direct analysis of  the underlying mechanisms that trigger the safety disconnect between
workers and safety experts. We present various interpretations of  how risk awareness is driven by different types of
knowledge (tacit or formally codified); however, we do not evaluate how shared beliefs between workers and safety
experts shape risk assessments, nor do we assess the processes through which perceived work safety generate.
Further research can address this point by evaluating whether perceived work safety varies among employees at
different organizational levels within the business (inter-business differences), and among employees working for
different  organizations  (intra-business  differences).  Also,  future  work  should  analyze  whether  aspects  of
organizational culture (safety climate, shared values or beliefs) explains the degree of  (mis)alignment of  employees
in terms of  perceived safety.  Second, future studies should evaluate whether safety experts’  risk awareness is
conditioned by factors related to the organization (safety climate or business culture) or to previous job experience
as a construction worker or as safety expert. Third, our work is inherently connected with prior work based on the
Resilience Engineering theory (e.g., Niskanen, 2018; Patriarca et al., 2018). In this sense, and building on Resilience
Engineering postulates, specifically designed future research should evaluate whether organizational resilience is
contingent to the interactions between individual actions and relations, as well as to organizational qualities resulting
from the organization and subsequent performance of  teams within the business.  Finally,  the geographic and
industry specificity of  the study calls for obvious caution when generalizing its findings. In this sense, future work
should assess the determinants of  perceived work safety in different industry sectors and in different geographic
contexts to further validate the results of  our study.
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